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PLAIN LANGUAGE V. COMMON SENSE:
EXAMINING THE PROBLEMATIC DECISION
IN IN RE VILLAGE AT CAMP BOWIE I, L.P.,
AND THE HARM IT WILL CAUSE FUTURE
CREDITORS
Brett D. Young
I. INTRODUCTION
In a Chapter 11 reorganization, a plan of reorganization can be
“crammed down” the throats of non-consenting creditors, but only if
the propounding party finds at least one class of “impaired” creditors
who will consent to the cramdown plan.1 A problem arises when
courts define the word “impairment”: does it mean genuinely “hurt,”
or does it mean simply “altered,” even when the alteration is not
really detrimental to the allegedly “impaired” class? The latter
definition allows parties to cram down reorganization plans using the
controversial technique of artificial impairment.2 Artificial
impairment is the “technique of minimally impairing a class of
creditors solely to create an impaired accepting class and to satisfy
[sic] prerequisite to cramdown of Chapter 11 plan.”3 Congress and
the Supreme Court are silent on whether the Bankruptcy Code allows
artificial impairment,4 giving lower courts the power to rule on
 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School; B.A. History and Psychology,
University of California, Santa Barbara, June 2012. I am extremely grateful to Professor Dan
Schechter for his constant encouragement, guidance, and passion for teaching, all of which made
this comment possible. Thank you to the talented and dedicated staff and editors of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work. Finally, I cannot thank my family and friends
enough for all their love and support.
1. See Richard M. Cieri et al., “The Long and Winding Road”: The Standards to Confirm
a Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Part II), 3 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 115, 146 (1994).
2. Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial
Classification or Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281, 310–12 (1992).
3. 5 BANKR. SERV. LAW. EDITION (West) § 45:103 (Jan. 2014).
4. Dan Schechter, Artificial Impairment of Small Class of Unsecured Creditors Is
Insufficient to Support Cramdown Plan of Reorganization [Federal National Mortgage
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artificial impairment as they see fit.5
Artificial impairment is a problematic development in Chapter
11 reorganization plans. The guidelines presented in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129 set forth the requirements for approval of a bankruptcy
reorganization plan;6 all impaired creditors must unanimously
approve the reorganization plan.7 However, under § 1129(b), an
exception allows a single class of creditors to approve a
reorganization plan in accordance with § 1129(a)(10).8 A plan
approved by this method is often known as a “cramdown”
reorganization plan because it is approved by a single vote, despite
the objection of the other classes.9 Thus, a cramdown plan permits a
single class of creditors to approve the plan, but only if the
consenting class is impaired as defined by § 1124.10
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Village at
Camp Bowie I, L.P.11 elected to follow Ninth Circuit precedent when
confronted with a reorganization plan that was confirmed by a
potentially artificially impaired class of creditors.12 As part of its
decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the position taken by the
Eighth Circuit, which advocated for a motive-based inquiry into the
reasons a class was impaired to prevent plans from being confirmed
by artificial impairment.13 Thus, in line with the Ninth Circuit,14 the
Fifth Circuit refused to distinguish between artificial and need-based
impairments.15 In choosing to follow the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth
Circuit has taken a position that not only damages a creditor’s rights
Association v. Village I, GP (W.D. Tenn. 2012).], COM. FIN. NEWSL., Jan. 28, 2013 (“Congress
has had numerous opportunities since 1993 to reject ‘artificial impairment’ and has not done so.
Arguably, that inaction is an implicit ratification of the Ninth Circuit’s approach. Perhaps the
Supreme Court will ultimately resolve the emerging circuit split.”).
5. See id.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012).
7. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
8. Id. § 1129(a)(10) (setting forth the provision that the plan must be confirmed by the
court if “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan”).
9. Cieri, supra note 1, at 147.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). The standard in § 1124 defines impairment simply as the
alteration of a creditor’s rights. Id. § 1124.
11. W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013).
12. Id.; L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim
Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993).
13. Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on
the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 127 (8th Cir. 1993).
14. In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d at 940.
15. In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 245.
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in the case at hand but sets a dangerous precedent for creditors who
are forced to accept cramdown reorganization plans on unfair terms.
This Comment addresses the controversial issue of artificial
impairment and seeks to establish that courts should refuse to allow
artificially impaired classes to approve cramdown reorganization
plans. Part II details the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Village at
Camp Bowie I, L.P. and its adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s rule
regarding artificial impairment. Part III explains the split among
bankruptcy courts over artificial impairment by analyzing statutes
and Eighth and Ninth Circuit precedent.16 Part IV argues that the
correct interpretation of § 1129(a)(10) includes a motive-based
inquiry into the reasons for impairment, to satisfy the legislative
intent and history of the Bankruptcy Code and to protect future
creditors. Finally, Part V concludes that courts should not interpret
the Bankruptcy Code using the strict textualist approach used by the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits,17 and that courts facing this problem in the
future should adopt the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (“Village”) acquired a parcel of
property in 2004, and began investing in improvements to make the
property more suitable for office and retail space.18 To finance the
project, Village infused a large sum of its own capital into the
project, but it also obtained a loan from a bank in exchange for a
promissory note secured by the real property.19 Through a series of
conveyances, Western Real Estate Equities (“Western”) came to hold
the note.20 After Village defaulted on the loan payment in August
2010, Western decided to hold a non-judicial foreclosure for the sale
of the property.21 Prior to the foreclosure proceedings, Village filed a
Chapter 11 petition staying the foreclosure sale.22
In November 2010, Village filed its original plan of
16. Id.; In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d at 940; In re Windsor on the River Assocs.,
Ltd., 7 F.3d at 127.
17. In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 239; In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995
F.2d at 940.
18. In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 242.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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reorganization under Chapter 11, but the court rejected the plan
because the insufficient equity infusion could not stabilize the
property.23 After a series of amendments, Village filed its second
reorganization plan, which the court approved after a cramdown
vote.24 The plan consisted of two classes of impaired creditors:
Western and a group of unsecured trade creditors who had performed
various jobs at the property.25 As part of the reorganization plan,
Western would receive a new five-year note in the amount of its
claim, with interest set at 5.84 percent per annum and a balloon
payment due at maturity.26 Additionally, the plan proposed to pay the
unsecured trade creditors in full within three months of the plan’s
approval, but the payment would not include interest—an amount
totaling approximately $900.27
Western objected to the plan, arguing that Village only impaired
the trade claims minimally, and that it did so to secure the necessary
vote to cram down the plan under § 1129(a)(10).28 In other words,
Western argued that Village artificially impaired the trade creditors’
claim to cram down the plan. The bankruptcy court rejected
Western’s argument, stating that § 1129(a)(10) did not distinguish
between “artificial impairment and economically driven
impairment.”29 Western appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.30
On appeal, Western again asserted its theory that a debtor could
not artificially impair a voting class of creditors to secure an
approving vote in a reorganization plan.31 The appellate court
analyzed this argument by assessing the two views of artificial
impairment adopted by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.32 The court
rejected the Eighth Circuit’s application of § 1129(a)(10), which
distinguished between economic and artificial impairment, in favor

23. Id.
24. Id. at 242–43.
25. Id. at 243.
26. Id. The amount owed on the promissory note to Western at the time the case was heard
was $32,112,711, compared to the $59,398 owed to the trade creditors. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 244.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 244–45.
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of the Ninth Circuit’s plain reading of the statute.33 The court
declared that “the Bankruptcy Code must be read literally, and
congressional intent is relevant only when the statutory language is
ambiguous.”34 In adopting the Ninth Circuit’s precedent and
reasoning, the court rejected Western’s argument, refusing to
distinguish between artificial impairment and any other type of
impairment.35 Consequently, it upheld confirmation of the plan.36
III. HISTORY OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN
THE EIGHTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Village at Camp
Bowie I, L.P.,37 the Eighth and Ninth Circuits opposed each other on
the issue of artificial impairment.38 To fully understand the flaw in
the Fifth Circuit’s decision39 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision,40 it is
necessary to review the Bankruptcy Code and analyze the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits’ holdings.
A. Statutes
The problem of artificial impairment arises in Chapter 11
reorganization plans.41 Once a debtor files for bankruptcy protection
and chooses to pursue a reorganization plan, there are two ways to
confirm a plan of reorganization: consensually or under a
“cramdown” scenario.42 In a consensual plan, all of the § 1129(a)
requirements must be met.43 This includes § 1129(a)(8), which
requires either that every class of creditors accept the plan or that no
non-consenting class is impaired.44 Thus, if there is an impaired

33. Id. at 245.
34. Id. at 246.
35. Id. at 245–46.
36. Id. at 248.
37. Id.
38. L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.),
995 F.2d 940, 942–43 (9th Cir. 1993); Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., v. Balcor Real Estate
Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 130–31 (8th Cir. 1993).
39. See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 245.
40. In re L & J Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d at 942–43.
41. See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 310–11.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)-(b) (2012).
43. Id. § 1129(a).
44. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
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non-consenting class, the plan cannot be confirmed.45
However, if § 1129(a)(8) cannot be satisfied, the propounding
party (usually, but not always, the debtor) can fall back on the
cramdown provisions of § 1129(b).46 Under § 1129(b)(1), a plan can
still be confirmed if all of the other elements of § 1129(a), other than
subsection (a)(8), are satisfied.47 Therefore, the § 1129(a)(10)
requirement that there be at least one impaired class vote to approve
the plan applies under § 1129(b).48 In other words, even if there are
some impaired but non-consenting classes of creditors, the plan can
still be confirmed under the cramdown provisions as long as there is
at least one impaired consenting class.49
Section 1124 determines whether the required claim for a
cramdown plan is impaired.50 This statute provides that a claim will
not be considered impaired unless the creditor’s rights are left
“unaltered” by the reorganization plan.51 The problem of artificial
impairment thus arises from reorganization plans confirmed under
§ 1129(a)(10), because § 1124’s alteration standard provides
minimal guidance on the definition of impairment.52 Additionally,
§ 1124 does not discuss artificial impairment, or whether there
should be any type of judicial probe into the reasons for impairing a
creditor’s claim.53
Using a strict textualist interpretation of these reorganization
statutes, debtors may strategically alter the claim of a class of
creditors to secure an approving vote for their reorganization plan.54
If, for example, a debtor delayed payment under a plan to a class of
unsecured creditors for a few months and denied them a small
interest payment, a court applying a strict textualist approach to the
45. See id. § 1129(a).
46. Id. § 1129(b).
47. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
48. Id. § 1129(a)(10).
49. See id. § 1129(a)(10), (b)(1).
50. Id. § 1124.
51. Id. (“[A] class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each
claim or interest of such class, the plan[:] (1) leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual
rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest . . . .”); Cieri,
supra note 1, at 118.
52. For example, some courts have interpreted § 1124 to mean that even a creditor whose
interests were improved can be considered impaired on the theory that the improved claim has
been “altered.” E.g., In re Temple Zion, 125 B.R. 910, 919 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)–(b).
54. Cieri, supra note 1, at 148.
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statutes would consider this claim altered, and thus impaired.55 In
this example, the class of unsecured creditors—whose claim is
minimally and “artificially” impaired by the plan—can cram down
the plan despite another creditor’s objections, regardless of the large
disparity between the amounts owed to each party by the debtor.56
B. Circuit Split
In In re Windsor On the River Associates, Ltd.,57 the Eighth
Circuit refused to uphold a bankruptcy reorganization plan approved
by an artificially impaired class of debtors.58 The court reasoned that
Congress intended § 1129 to promote consensual reorganization, and
concluded that it would be “odd” if certain creditors could
circumvent
consensual
reorganization
through
artificial
impairment.59 Additionally, the court stated in dicta that one of the
primary functions of the Bankruptcy Code was to discourage side
dealing, something that would surely occur if debtors were permitted
to manufacture impairment to garner approval of a reorganization
plan.60
As part of its holding, the Eighth Circuit declared that satisfying
§ 1124 requires a factual inquiry into whether the debtor manipulated
the terms of the plan to secure an approving vote using
§ 1129(a)(10).61 Although the court failed to articulate the exact test
it would apply to determine whether the debtor’s manipulation
resulted in genuine impairment,62 other courts have interpreted the
holding to require economic necessity for the impairment.63
55. See Clarkson v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co. (In re Clarkson), 767 F.2d 417, 418 n.1 (8th
Cir. 1985).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10); id. § 1124.
57. Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on
the River Assocs.), 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993).
58. Id. at 132.
59. Id. at 131.
60. Id. at 132.
61. Id.
62. See In re Windsor On the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re
Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993).
63. W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2013). Other courts have used the same interpretation
of the Eighth Circuit’s standard. See, e.g., In re Ridgewood Apartments of DeKalb Cnty., Ltd.,
183 B.R. 784, 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995); In re Gramercy Twins Assocs., 187 B.R. 112, 118
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re W.C. Peeler Co., Inc., 182 B.R. 435, 437 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995); In
re Inv. Fla. Aggressive Growth Fund, Ltd., 168 B.R. 760, 766–67 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994).
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Taking a strict textualist approach, the Ninth Circuit, in In re
L & J Anaheim Associates, defined impairment using § 1124’s plain
language.64 As a result, the court chose to uphold the reorganization
plan even though it was proposed and approved by an artificially
impaired class of creditors in a cramdown vote.65 The proposed plan
compelled the sale of the real property at issue to pay off creditors.66
The Ninth Circuit upheld the plan’s confirmation because the
creditor, who proposed and voted to approve the plan, lost
contractual remedies available to it against the debtor as a result of
the sale.67 The plan’s proponent satisfied § 1124’s alteration
requirement because the creditor lost these previously available
contractual remedies.68 The court disregarded the fact that the
creditor attempted to foreclose in the first place but was prevented
from doing so when the debtor filed for bankruptcy,69 and instead
chose to focus its reasoning on the plain satisfaction of the statute.70
Most importantly, the court’s decision has been interpreted to mean
that a creditor’s rights are impaired when they are altered and not
necessarily harmed.71 The Fifth Circuit used the Ninth Circuit’s
definition of impairment in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. to
preclude a motive-based inquiry into why Village impaired the trade
creditors’ claim, because the court determined the creditors’ rights
were altered.72
IV. ANALYSIS
Using § 1129(a)(10), Village crammed down the reorganization
plan despite the objections of Western, whose secured interest had a
value more than fifty times the amount owed to the trade creditors.73
As this large disparity in value demonstrates, courts must look
beyond the plain language of the statute to ensure that they fairly
64. L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.),
995 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1993).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Schechter, supra note 4.
72. W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C., v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2013).
73. Id.
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approve reorganization plans. The Fifth Circuit, then, erred by
following the Ninth Circuit’s strict textualist approach. By strictly
adhering to the Bankruptcy Code’s language, the Fifth Circuit
ignored why the Bankruptcy Code permits cramdown plans and
harmed future creditors in bankruptcy reorganization plans.
A. The Bankruptcy Code Should Be Read
to Require a “Harmed” Rather Than “Altered”
Standard of Impairment
Courts often demonize cramdown reorganization plans because
such plans do not reflect the goal of consensual reorganizations that
the Bankruptcy Code purports to champion.74 However, courts have
justified the use of cramdown reorganizations in cases where the
consenting class is “also hurt and nonetheless favors the plan.”75
When a class of creditors that is actually hurt by the plan still favors
the plan, a court can infer that the plan is fair because those creditors
presumably voted in good faith in favor of reorganization, rather than
liquidation.76
A historical analysis of the circumstances leading up to the
creation of the modern § 1129 further supports the idea that the
statute requires the plan to “hurt” an approving creditor.77 According
to 11 U.S.C. § 861, the predecessor to § 1129, a party could cram
down a reorganization plan as long as the mortgagee, the party
making the loan for a mortgage on real property, received the
appraised value of the property.78 The statute treated the mortgagee
as a consenting class whose consent could be used to approve a
reorganization plan.79 Plans approved using this technique were often
extremely inequitable, because debtors could make cash payments
for real property in depressed markets for a value equal to the

74. In re 266 Washington Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing
the path to cramdown reorganization as “torturous”), aff’d sub nom. In re Washington Assocs.,
147 B.R. 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 312 (stating that Chapter 11’s goal is “to
foster plans of reorganizations which are consensual to the greatest possible extent”).
75. Cieri, supra note 1, at 147.
76. Id.
77. Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on
the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 131 (8th Cir. 1993); Cieri, supra note 1, at 147.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 861 (1976).
79. In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d at 131.
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depressed appraised value.80 This forced the creditor to accept the
reorganization plan, no matter how inequitable.81
Congress sought to prevent this type of inequitable result by
amending the Bankruptcy Code in 1984.82 The changes to the Code
allocated power to creditors in reorganization plans by explicitly
requiring the accepting class to be impaired.83 That is, a creditor
receiving the depressed market value of the property in the situation
mentioned above would not be considered impaired and, thus, could
not be used to approve a cramdown plan.84 This congressional
history indicates an intent to empower creditors in cramdown plans,
whereas artificial impairment weakens larger creditors in
reorganization plans, contrary to congressional intent. The Fifth
Circuit failed to address any of the statutory history surrounding the
1984 amendment.85 Instead, the court reasoned that the statute must
be read as written, unless there are ambiguities.86
The Ninth Circuit largely ignored these policy concerns with its
plain-language reading of the statute,87 leading the Fifth Circuit to
make the same mistake.88 Because the Fifth Circuit did not require
that the plan “hurt” the consenting class, Village was able to
gerrymander a consenting class’s approval using artificial
impairment.89 Under the plan, the trade creditors’ claim was
impaired but definitely not “harmed,” because the plan guaranteed
the creditors nearly full payment within three months of
confirmation.90 The only loss the creditors suffered under the plan
was $900 in interest payments.91
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion better reflects the underlying
rationale of the Bankruptcy Code. By rejecting artificial impairment
and looking into the reasons that a plan impairs a creditor’s claims,
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Meltzer, supra note 2, at 312.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 312–13.
85. See W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C., v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013).
86. Id. at 246.
87. See L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim
Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993).
88. In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 245.
89. See id. at 243–47.
90. Id. at 243.
91. See id. at 243 n.3.
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the Eighth Circuit’s opinion ensures that the class of creditors
approving the plan was genuinely harmed.92 In its opinion, the
Eighth Circuit stated that a creditor’s claim would not be considered
impaired by a reorganization plan if “the alteration of rights in
question arises solely from the debtor’s exercise of discretion.”93
Consequently, in the Eighth Circuit, an inquiry is necessary to
determine if the plan actually hurts a party in order to satisfy the
underlying policy of the statute.94
In In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., there is no question that
the plan impaired the trade creditors’ rights under § 1124,95 but the
problem arises when the reason for impairment is examined.
Village’s decision to withhold payment from the unsecured creditors
was, without more information, an act of pure discretion. This can be
inferred from the fact that Village’s pre-petition owners had to infuse
$1.5 million into the business as part of the plan, giving them the
cash on hand to pay off the small claim held by the trade creditors.96
As a result, the Eighth Circuit would have rejected the plan because,
on its face, there was no compelling reason to delay payment to the
trade creditors.97 It is important to mention that by rejecting the
Eighth Circuit’s test, the Fifth Circuit never looked into why Village
impaired the rights of the unsecured creditors.98 It is entirely possible
that there was an economic reason aside from discretion for
impairing the trade creditors’ rights, but that question will remain
unanswered. The court’s limited reading of the statute denies any
further inquiry into the debtor’s motive for the chosen impairment.
B. Adopting Ninth Circuit Precedent
Will Harm Future Creditors.
The failure of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits to consider the
consequences of the strict textualist approach that they have adopted
is a huge shortcoming of both opinions.99 One particularly chilling
92. Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on
the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012).
96. In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 243.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1124.
98. See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 245–48.
99. W. Real Estate Equities, L.L.C., v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp

PLAIN LANGUAGE V. COMMON SENSE

1098

11/15/2014 1:16 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1087

effect of these courts’ application of § 1129(a)(10) is that it would
encourage debtors to view the statute as an alternative to refinancing
when debtors are unable to refinance on the open market.100 If a
debtor knows that it can use the Bankruptcy Code to reorganize its
debt using artificial impairment, the debtor is more likely to
refinance in this manner than on the open market, especially if the
project lacks financial promise.101 Furthermore, permitting artificial
impairment would certainly lead to side dealing between creditors
and debtors.102 Scenarios where a debtor would seek out the
approving vote of a small, unsecured class of creditors in exchange
for a beneficial reorganization plan would become common.
Unfortunately, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits failed to address any
of these possible concerns. Instead, they chose to ignore the huge
impact their decisions will have on creditors’ rights in the future.
Perhaps the most problematic development associated with the
Ninth Circuit’s precedent is that it entirely swallows consensual
reorganization plans promoted under § 1129(a).103 As Meltzer
suggests, “Plan proponents could circumvent the impairment
requirement at will by impairing creditors in trivial ways. As we
have seen, a mere temporary delay in payment can constitute
impairment. A 99% payment constitutes impairment. Even enhanced
treatment constitutes impairment.”104 Debtors working to secure a
reorganization plan will always find a way to impair a class of
creditors who would be willing to approve a mutually beneficial
reorganization plan. As a result, § 1129(a) would serve no purpose
because all reorganization plans would be approved using the
cramdown provision. This would render a large secured creditor’s
vote meaningless because they are always impaired under the plan,
and never the party sought by the debtor to secure a cramdown
plan.105
It is inferred from the Eighth Circuit’s opinion that courts should
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013); L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l,
Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993).
100. Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on
the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012).
104. Meltzer, supra note 2, at 319.
105. See, e.g., In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 243; In re L & J Anaheim
Assocs., 995 F.2d at 942–43.
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investigate the reasons a plan impaired a creditor’s rights, to prevent
artificial impairment and protect creditors’ rights from the harms
mentioned above.106 Some scholars argue that imposing a
court-based inquiry into the motivations behind impairment will lead
to problematic results.107 For example, opponents of the Eighth
Circuit decision argue that all impairment results from discretion,
and no matter what kind of economic framework or reason is
presented, the impairment of a creditor is solely based on debtor
discretion.108 This argument, like the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’
approaches, takes textualism to the extreme. Of course all
impairment will result from discretion, but the Eighth Circuit
decision sought to add to the statute a fact-finding inquiry to the
reasons behind the exercise of discretion.109 To receive court
approval of a plan, a debtor need only justify the reasons for
impairing a creditor’s claim, but that justification cannot include
manufacturing a consenting class.110
In his article On the River of Artificial and Arbitrary
Impairment: An Erroneous Analysis,111 Eric W. Lam presents a
particularly harmful interpretation of the Eighth Circuit opinion
using a hypothetical.112 His hypothetical outlines a bankruptcy
reorganization plan that includes a debtor who will use incoming
cash flow, from revenue generated by the business, to repay a loan to
a secured creditor over the course of ten years without an infusion of
capital.113 Additionally, the plan calls for repayment of an unsecured
class of creditors’ claims totaling $13,000 over the course of two
years, also using revenue from the business.114 A projection
estimates that, after paying all of its monthly obligations and
operating the business, the business will have a cash surplus of
$13,000 after the first month, enough to pay the class of unsecured
106. See Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor
on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993).
107. Eric W. Lam, On the River of Artificial and Arbitrary Impairment: An Erroneous
Analysis, 70 N.D. L. REV. 993, 1003 (1994).
108. Id.
109. See In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d at 132.
110. Id.
111. Lam, supra note 107.
112. Id. at 1001–02.
113. Id. at 1001.
114. Id.
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trade creditors.115 Lam suggests that if the debtor decided to use the
excess capital to invest in the business for improvements, a court
adopting the Eighth Circuit’s opinion would view this decision as an
act of discretion that qualified as artificial impairment.116 As a result,
Lam believes that the court would not approve a vote from these
creditors to cram down the plan, because the creditors’ impairment
was based solely on the debtor’s discretion.117
Lam’s reasoning appears to be flawed. If the business were
dependent on the improvements to create the revenue necessary to
pay both classes of creditors under the reorganization plan, the court
would have determined this necessity during its inquiry, and would
not have viewed this solely as an exercise of discretion.118 The
hypothetical suggested by Lam is a perfect example of a situation
where an inquiry-based analysis of the reasons for impairment would
be extremely effective, rather than the opposite as he suggests.119 It is
very unlikely that a court would find the investment of capital back
into the business to constitute a “technique” of the debtor to “create
an impaired accepting class.”120 Instead, a court faced with this
hypothetical would find that the plan necessarily impaired unsecured
creditors’ rights, giving the indicia of fairness needed by the statutes
for a cramdown reorganization plan’s approval. Indeed, the court
could approve the plan knowing that the debtor’s reason for
impairing the creditor’s claim was not to secure a consenting vote,
but instead a necessary business decision.
Instead of making a specific inquiry into the precise reason for
the impairment as the Eighth Circuit advocated, the Fifth Circuit
relied on the provision contained in § 1129(a)(3),121 which requires
that a party propose his or her reorganization plan in good faith.122
Under that global approach, if the bankruptcy court finds that a party
proposed the plan in good faith, no other inquiry into a debtor’s

115. Id.
116. Id. at 1002.
117. Id.
118. See W. Real Estate Equities, Inc. v. Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp
Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2013); Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor
Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993).
119. Lam, supra note 107, at 1001–03.
120. Cieri et al., supra note 1, at 148.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012).
122. In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 247.
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motive for impairing the claims of a class of creditors is necessary.123
This cannot be the standard that bankruptcy courts adopt because it
places too much power in the debtor’s hands and drastically reduces
a larger creditor’s control during the reorganization process.124
Overall, good faith is a sloppy standard that is much easier to satisfy
than a need-based review.125 While good faith might be an
alternative to the artificial impairment problem, it is not a total or
desirable solution. Bad faith and artificial impairment are not
synonyms.126 The bankruptcy court in In re Village at Camp Bowie I,
L.P. found that Village proposed the plan in good faith, despite the
clear artificial impairment involved in the case.127 Adopting the good
faith argument places some limitations on artificial impairment, but
is not a complete bar like a need-based review would be. To properly
adjudicate disputes involving artificial impairment, courts must not
rely on the low bar of good faith used by the Fifth Circuit.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly took a staunch textualist approach
to its reading of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Fifth Circuit
incorrectly followed that precedent. Such precedent has a damaging
effect on large, undersecured creditors in the approval of bankruptcy
reorganization plans. The Fifth Circuit decision takes textualism to
the extreme and ignores the reasons that cramdown reorganizations
are permitted under § 1129(a)(10).128 When Congress created the
modern § 1129, it was conscious of past problems created by
cramdown reorganization plans.129 Although the express language of
the statute does not require courts to look into the reasons a plan
impaired a creditor’s claim, courts like the Eighth Circuit correctly
imported this kind of inquiry into the statute, and for good reason.
The split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits is well

123. Id. at 248.
124. See id. at 247–48; L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J
Anaheim Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940, 942–43 (9th Cir. 1993).
125. See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 247–48; In re Temple Zion, 125 B.R.
910, 920 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
126. See In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 247–48.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 247.
129. Meltzer, supra note 2, at 312.
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established.130 The Fifth Circuit decision is the most recent to take a
side on the issue of gerrymandering a voting class using the
Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provision.131 As the growing split
indicates, this is a contentious issue and the Supreme Court must take
action and overturn the Ninth Circuit’s precedent,132 clarifying the
issue for courts that face it in the future.

130. The list of cases opting to follow the Eighth Circuit is growing rapidly. See, e.g., In re
All Land Invs., LLC, 468 B.R. 676, 690 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012); In re Daly, 167 B.R. 734, 737
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In re N. Washington Ctr. Ltd. P’ship, 165 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. D. Md.
1994).
131. In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 247–48.
132. L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawaski Leasing Int’l, Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.),
995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993).

